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Environmental Law
by W. Scott Laseter*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This Article is the third survey of environmental case law in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and covers the
period of January 1993 to December 1994.1 The survey comes at a time
when the nation's political climate has turned dramatically to the right
with the majority of both houses of Congress now being held by the
Republican Party. Over the last two decades, it sometimes appeared as
if Congress was pushing a reluctant judiciary uphill towards enforcing
more stringent environmental laws. In the months ahead, however,
Congress may instead be seen pumping the brakes to slow down what
many view as virtual runaway environmental programs. In the first few
weeks of the 104th Congress, members have proposed major revisions to
several cornerstone environmental statutes including the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)2
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA7),3 and have proposed to repeal the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.4
If history is any gauge, voices from the center and left will likely
considerably water-down this ambitious agenda as the realities of the

* Associate in the firm of Long, Aldridge & Norman, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
The South (B.A., Psychology, 1984); Mercer University (J.D., magna cur laude, 1990).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1988-1990).
1. For a survey of Eleventh Circuit environmental law prior to 1991, see Edward A.
Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REv. 1411 (1991). For
cases from 1991 to 1993, see Edward A. Kazmarek &W. Scott Laseter, EnvironmentalLaw,
44 MERCER L. REv. 1187 (1993).

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1995), for proposed bill, see H.R. 795, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1995), for proposed bill, see H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).

4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7671 (1995), for proposed bill, see H.R. 479, 104th Cir., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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complex nature of environmental problems and the myriad of special
interests come into focus. Nonetheless, the momentum for change in the
legislative and administrative branches may well re-open questions of
environmental law which now appear settled. Indeed, even CERCLA's
notorious scheme of retroactive joint and several liability, which has
perhaps best epitomized the force of environmental law, has been opened
for debate in Congress.
Despite the possibility of sweeping changes in certain programs (or
perhaps because of it), this Article surveys significant environmental
decisions by the Eleventh Circuit and selected decisions from the
associated district courts.5 In keeping with past formats, the Article
begins with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), s followed
by the CWA 7 and CERCLA.' Also included is a section on the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),9 which, although not new,
received significant treatment by the Eleventh Circuit for arguably the
first time during the survey period.10 With the exception of the section
on RCRA, the overview of the basic statutory scheme contained in earlier
Surveys is omitted but can be obtained from those articles. 1

II. DISCUSSION OF CASES
A.

The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act

2

1. Major Federal Action. In United States v. Southern Florida
Water Management District3 the Eleventh Circuit shed further light
upon what constitutes a "major federal action" sufficient to trigger
NEPA's obligation that the agency access whether the environmental
impacts are significant. The case arose from a long-standing dispute

5. The Eleventh Circuit hears appeals from the United States District Courts for
Alabama, Florida and Georgia. See 28 U.S.C. § 41.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70.
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1995).
10. A number of statutes which might be at home in an environmental law survey are
absent either because they have not been the subject of significant decisions in the

Eleventh Circuit, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 26032692 (1995), or because, like the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1995) they are more appropriately treated in other surveys.
11. See Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Enuironmental Law, 42 MERCER

L. REv. 1411 (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70.
13. 28 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994).
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concerning water pollution in the Everglades region of Florida caused by
extensive agricultural activities. 4 The United States, as the owner of
both the Everglades National Park and the Loxahatchee National
Wildlife Refuge, sought to compel the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation ("FDER") and the South Florida Water Management
District ("SFWMD") to apply more stringent controls on excessive
nutrient loading caused by run-off from agricultural activities to the
north of the Everglades. In settling the case, the federal government
entered into a settlement agreement with FDER and the SFWMD which
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
converted to a consent decree.' 5
The consent decree primarily provided interim and long-term
phosphorous concentration limits for the park and refuge and delineated
specific remedial programs designed to achieve those limits. 6 At the
urging of the cities of Belle Grande and Clewiston, Florida and several
agricultural organizations, however, the district court held the negotiation and implementation of the Settlement Agreement constituted a
"major federal action" requiring an environmental impact statement
17
("EIS") pursuant to NEPA.
Reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit drew a distinction
between government activities which merely lay ground work for future
decision making and those which will themselves result in governmental
action.'" The Eleventh Circuit found the primary thrust of the consent
decree was to require state agencies to follow state law.'9 The mere
possibility that the consent decree might result in the future in greater
federal involvement in the decision making process, either through
funding or through more direct actions, was not sufficient to convert the
federal government's negotiation of the consent decree into a major
federal action within the meaning of NEPA.20

14. Id. at 1567-68.
15. United States v. Southern Fla. Water Management Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D.
Fla. 1992).
16. Id. at 1569.
17. Id. at 1572. Although the district court held its finding of a major federal action
would require an EIS, this holding misstates NEPA's requirements. In actuality, a finding
that a project is a major federal action necessitates a less onerous environmental
assessment which, in turn, determines whether an EIS is required. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3.
18. 28 F.3d at 1572-73.
19. Id
20. Id. at 1573. See also Kieppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S., 390, 399-402 (1976);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The Clean Water Act,

1. Defining the Waters of United States. The Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Mills v. United States22 may prove to be as significant for
what it expressly did not decide as for the decision's actual holding. The
case involved an appeal of the sentence from a criminal conviction
arising out of the unlawful placing of fill material into the "waters of the
United States"' in violation of the CWA. 2' The convictions resulted
from the filling of a portion of a residential lot to build a driveway
located adjacent to East Bay, which empties to the Gulf of Mexico on
Florida's west coast.' In appealing their sentences, the defendants
raised the issue of whether the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") had
authority to regulate the discharge of fill material into wetlands which
were not navigable waters but, rather, were merely adjacent to such
navigable waters.'
The Eleventh Circuit made short work of this
defense citing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc." which held that the Corps' interpretation of
waters of the United States to include wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters is reasonable and in keeping with the expressed intent of
Congress. 28
However, in a footnote that may be a beacon for future litigants, the
Eleventh Circuit pointed out, "[tihe question of whether the corps'
authority properly extends to regulating the discharge of fill material
onto wetlands not adjacent to bodies of open water was not before the
Supreme Court [in Riverside Bayview Homes] nor is it before us now."29"
Thus, while the decision itself is unremarkable, it could be read as an
limitation to future litigants travelling under slightly different facts.
2.
Statute of Limitations. In United States v. Windward
Properties, Inc."0 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia decided another potentially significant decision
concerning section 404 enforcement cases. The case involved the alleged

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1994).
33 U.S.C. § 1311, 1344, 1362; 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(a), 328.3.
36 F.3d at 1054.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1056.
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Id. at 131-39.
36 F.3d at 1056 n.5.
821 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
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placement of fill into three creeks as part of a large development located
north of Atlanta near Alpharetta, Georgia.3 The construction firm had
completed the fill activities by March 1982, but the government did not
file suit until February 1991.32 Consequently, the defendant sought
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. 33
The parties agreed that the five-year statute of limitations set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied to the government's claim for fines or
penalties. o The government, however, asserted section 2462 did not

apply to its claim for injunctive relief.'
Further, the government
argued that the statute of limitations begins to run when the government actually learns of the violation, while the defendant argued that
the period commenced at the time of violation.'
On the question of whether the statute of limitations applied to the
government's claim for injunctive relief, the district court held, "when
legal and equitable relief are available concurrently (i.e., when an action
at law or equity could be brought on the same facts), 'equity will
withhold its relief... where the applicable statute of limitations would
bar the concurrent legal remedy."'3 7 Therefore, if the government's
claim for fines or penalties was barred, the claim for injunctive relief
would likewise be barred.
Considering when the limitations period begins to run, the district
court rejected both the government's "actual knowledge" accrual time
and the defendant's date of violation trigger. Instead, the court opted for
an "objective discovery rule" under which the statutory period commences when the government either actually discovers or, "'through the use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered' the violation."'
Deciding that a genuine issue of material fact remained on when the
government should have discovered the offense, the court denied
defendant's summary judgment motion.39

31. Id. at 692.
32. Id. at 692-93.
33. Id. at 692.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 693.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)).
38. Id. at 695 (quoting Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992)).
39. Id. The government also apparently asserted that the defendant's activities
constituted a "continuing violation." Id. at 693. Although not clear from the opinion, this
argument would presumably assert that each day the defendant maintains the fill material
constitutes a new violation. Consequently, the government would argue that, even if the
statute of limitations had run from the date of the original violation, it was still entitled
to recover for any period of continuing violation during the five years immediately
preceding the lawsuit. The opinion does not appear to rule on this assertion. However,
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C. The Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and
Liability Act4"
1. Persons Liable Under the Act.
a. Operator Liability. The last edition of the Environmental Law
Survey reported the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida's decision in Jacksonville Electric Authority v. Eppinger &
Russell Co.,41 which held on summary judgment that a university
(Tufts) which had owned most or all of the stock of a corporation in the
wood treatment business from 1925 to 1942 was not liable under
CERCLA as an "operator."2 Affirming that decision, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted a two-pronged test under which a person may be liable
as an operator either because: 1) it was actually involved in the facility's
day-to-day business efforts, or 2) because it was actively involved in
decisions related to the disposal of hazardous substances."
The determination of whether a person qualifies as an operator is
extremely fact-sensitive. Therefore, a close examination of the evidence
the plaintiff presented to the trial court in its losing effort to survive
summary judgment is important:
(1) Tufts owned all or almost all the stock in Eppinger; (2) Tufts
dictated the terms of employment of Eppinger's President (Chadwick)
and other executive officers; (3) Tufts' creation of a profit sharing plan
for the Eppinger officers; (4) Eppinger's distribution of dividends in
excess of net earnings during Tufts' period of ownership, which
allegedly contributed to a situation where the equipment at the wood
preserving facility was not properly upgraded and replaced; (5) Tufts'
receipt of reports at Trustee meetings on the status of Eppinger's
operations; (6) Tufts' alleged hiring of William Cook as Director, VicePresident, and General Manager of Eppinger; (7) statements by
Trustees to the effect that Tufts carried on a business at the Eppinger
facility; (8) during Tufts' period of ownership, the method of wood

it is worth noting that the statute prohibits the "placement" of fill material into the waters

of the United States, not the maintenance of such materials. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311, 1344,
1362. Therefore, it would seem that a "continuing violation" theory would require a rather
expansive reading of the statute. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
41. 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
42. CERCLA section 107(a)(2) makes liable "any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C. 9607(aX2).
43. Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993).
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treatment was changed from the use of arsenic salt to the use of
another unspecified chemical."
In laying out the two-pronged test, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
When reviewing the record to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence
of Tufts' operation of the Eppinger facility, we seek more than just
indicia of a parent-subsidiary relationship. We look for evidence that
would demonstrate that Tufts was actively involved in Eppinger's
occupational business affairs, or that Tufts itself actually participated
in the contamination."
Finding that Tufts satisfied neither branch, the Eleventh Circuit
afflirmed the trial court's decision." The rather sympathetic nature of
the university defendant no doubt influenced the court's analysis:
It is particularly important that the record contain such evidence in a
case such as this, where the parent company-the trustees of a
university-is in an entirely different business than that of the
subsidiary. Certain isolated bits of evidence in this record may have
greater meaning if attributed to a parent engaged in a similar
endeavor such that a greater level of direct involvement and control by
47
the parent could be presumed. Such is not the case here.
Thus, a defendant with a similar indicia of involvement in a management of the facility might fare worse if that defendant's primary
business is more closely related to the types of activities engaged in at
the facility.
b. Liability as PersonArrangingfor Disposal. In ChathamSteel Corp.
v. Brown,' the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Florida held that a party need not have an intent to dispose of or treat
hazardous substances in order to be liable as a person arranging for the
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances. The relevant part of the
statute provides liability for any person who:
by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel

44. 776 F. Supp. at 1548.

45. 996 F.2d at 1111.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 858 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
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owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances.49

Chatham Steel involved a private cost recovery action at the former
site of a battery recycler. The plaintiffs named a number of parties who
had sold spent batteries, either directly to the recycler or to intervening
brokers who subsequently sold them to the recycler.5' As to the
defendants who sold batteries directly to the recycler, the court rejected
defenses based on lack of intent regarding, or even knowledge of, the
ultimate disposition of the batteries.5 1 In so doing, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to follow a number of cases which have read section
107(a)(3) as requiring intent to dispose of or treat the hazardous
substances before liability will attach. 2 Further, the court also
distinguished apparent dicta from Eleventh Circuit precedent found in
FloridaPower & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp."
In Allis Chalmers, the Eleventh Circuit held that a manufacturer of
electric transformers would not be liable for clean-up costs of the facility
where those transformers were disposed of by parties who purchased the
transformers from the manufacturer and used them for a number of
years.5 The Eleventh Circuit noted the plaintiffs in Allis Chalmers
"did not present any affidavits to support their contention that the
manufacturers intended to otherwise dispose of hazardous waste when
they sold the transformers."' The district court in Chatham Steel,
however, read the Eleventh Circuit's decision as placing emphasis on the
fact that the defendants in Allis Chalmers sold useful products, not on
the absence of intent." In contrast, the defendants in Chatham Steel
were not selling a useful product, and they were clearly aware that the
used batteries would be broken down and processed before any
components would be reused." Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the defendants who sold batteries directly to the recycler
"essentially trafficked in a hazardous substance. This is precisely the
type of transaction CERCLA covers. "58

49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX3).
50. 858 F. Supp at 1135-36.
51. Id. at 113842.
52. See, e.g., Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
53. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of this case, see Edward A.
Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1411, 1442-44
(1991).

54. 893 F.2d at 1319.
55.
56.

Id.
858 F. Supp. at 1140.

57. Id. at 114041.
58. Id. at 1140.
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However, the court in Chatham Steel denied summary judgment as to
certain "indirect sellers" who sold batteries to intervening brokers.""
In so doing, the court stated:
Unlike the other defendants, these defendants did not make the
decision to sell batteries to [the recycler]. Instead, the battery broker
chose who would recycle the batteries. Under the reasoning of A & F
Materials, it would appear these indirect sellers should not be held
liable under § 107(a)(3). Indeed, liability under CERCLA is not
boundless. If a party does not exercise some control over the location
and method of disposal, then it should not be held liable under
CERCLA.
At the same time, parties cannot escape liability under CERCLA
merely because they pawned their hazardous substances off on a
broker or middleman. As noted earlier, persons who generate
hazardous substances or arrange for their disposal should not be
allowed to shirk their duties under CERCLA by operating blindfolded.
Thus, the Court concludes defendants who sold batteries to [the
recycler] through a battery broker cannot avoid liability merely because
it was the middleman who decided to sell the batteries to [the recycler].
Instead, if the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that
[the recycler] would be the ultimate recipient of its batteries and still
sold the batteries to the broker, then the defendant can be found liable
under § 107(aX3).'
Finding that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the
indirect seller's knowledge of where the batteries would end up, the
court denied cross-motions for summary judgment against both the
plaintiffs and the indirect sellers. 1
2. Lender Liability. As was suggested in the First Environmental
Law Survey,6 2 the terror United States v. Fleet Factors3 visited upon
the lending community in 1990 appears to have largely faded in the
wake of subsequent, less threatening decisions from other circuits" and
a fairly pro-lender interpretive rule from the Environmental Protection

59.
60.
61.
62.
1411,
63.

Id. at 1144.
Id.
Id.
Edward A.Kazmarek &W. Scott Laseter, EnvironmentalLaw, 42 MERCER L. REV.
1436-42 (1991).
901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).

64. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); Z&Z Leasing v.
Graying Reel, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Kemp Indus. v. Safety Light Corp.,
857 F. Supp. 373 (D.N.J. 1994); Snediker Developers v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
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Agency ("EPA").'
Consequently, the district court's subsequent
decisions in Fleet" have garnered far less attention. However, several
aspects of the latest district court decision merit some consideration.
By way of background, Fleet Factors involved the bankruptcy of the
Swainsboro Print Works ("SPW") and subsequent foreclosure by Fleet. 7
Following foreclosure, Fleet hired independent contractors who
imprudently handled drums of hazardous substances and asbestos waste
left behind by SPW. The EPA performed a removal action and sought
recovery of its response costs from Fleet." Fleet sought summary
judgment under CERCLA's secured creditor exemption. 9 The district
court denied that motion on the basis that Fleet's involvement in
management of the facility destroyed the exemption, a decision affirmed
by the Eleventh Circuit's famous decision in Fleet Factor.7"
Following a bench trial, the district court ruled that Fleet was liable
for EPA's response cost." In so doing, the court held that the EPA's
Lender Liability Rule must be narrowly construed72 and that a secured
creditor seeking protection from the rule bears the burden of showing
that it falls within the exception to liability.7" It then examined Fleet's
conduct both before and after foreclosure.
Although the court found Fleet liable due to its agent's post-foreclosure
activities, lenders may find equally interesting the wide range of preforeclosure activities which the court said did not destroy the secured
creditor exemption.74 These activities include: 1) liquidating inventory;
2) covering SPW's payroll; 3) paying SPW's bills; 4) participating in
resolution of customer disputes; and 5) pre-approving all goods
shipments, credit terms and price terms.76 Further, the Eleventh
Circuit even stated that "incidental handling of hazardous substances
does not void the Exemption. 7 6 Indeed, it was not until Fleet's agents

65. EPA Lender Liability Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1995).
66. 819 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Ga. 1993); 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
67. 901 F.2d at 1558. See also Edward A.Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1411, 1436-42 (1991).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XA).
69. 724 F. Supp. 955, 958-59 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
70. 901 F.2d at 1550, 1560.

71. 821 F. Supp. at 721.
72. Id. at 714 n.13.
73. Id. at 713 n.12.
74. Id. at 716.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 719. This statement should be compared to the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993). That decision
held that making decisions about disposal of hazardous substances can result in CERCLA
liability as an "operator." Thus, if the district court's decision in Fleet withstands
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conspicuously mishandled the hazardous substances that the court found
the protection was lost.77 Thus, in a rather ironic twist, lenders may
soon be seeking shelter under, rather than from, the Fleet Factors line
of cases.
3. Procedural Issues.
a. State Statute of Limitations. The Eleventh Circuit decided one
other CERCLA case during the survey period which may have important
consequences beyond the context of CERCLA litigation. In Tucker v.
Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 7 the Eleventh Circuit considered the
effect of CERCLA Section 309 which requires that the statute of
limitations for certain causes of actions arising under state law begin
running at the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known
about the alleged harm (i.e., a "discovery rule").79
Tucker involved a class action brought by property owners in the
vicinity of a Southern Wood Piedmont Company facility in Georgia,
which for a number of years had used a variety of potentially hazardous
chemicals for treating wood products." The class action made a
number of state and federal law claims, including claims for nuisance
under Georgia law."1 Examining Official Code of Georgia Annotated
section 9-3-30, the district court held that a four-year statute of
limitations would apply to those claims alleging property damage.8 2
Further, under Georgia law, the statute of limitations begins to run
when the alleged harm occurs, not when it is discovered.' As a result,
since the Southern Wood Piedmont facility had ceased the alleged
harmful process in 1986, Georgia's statute of limitations would bar those
claims. However, the district court held that Section 309 required the
use of a discovery rule despite Georgia's law to the contrary.84
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' The court examined the statute
which provides:

subsequent review, it appears that an argument could be made that conduct within the

secured creditor exemption could nonetheless result in operator liability.
77. 821 F. Supp. at 720.
78. 28 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1994).
79. Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (1995)).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1090.
Id.
Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 1993 WL 733015 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
See Hanna v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 446 S.E.2d 741 (1994).
1993 WL 733015, at *3.

85.

28 F.3d at 1093.
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In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury,
or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure
to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into
the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for
such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under
common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the
federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at
the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified
in such State statute.M
The statute defines "commencement date" as "the date specified in a
[state] statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period.' 7
However, the statute further provides "the term
'federally required commencement date' means the date the plaintiff
knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or
property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were
caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant concerned.'
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the four-year period provided under Georgia law begins when the
plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, the alleged harm.8 9
For jurisdictions like Georgia that do not apply the discovery rule to
claims involving real property, the decision in Tucker could have a
significant impact. The precise reach of the decision, however, is unclear
at this time. At least one other court has held that section 309 is limited
to cases where there is also a claim for cost recovery under CERCLA.
Since the plaintiffs in Tucker also made claims for CERCLA cost
recovery, neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit ever
discussed this possible limitation. To date, it does not appear that any
published decision from a Georgia state court or a federal court applying
Georgia law has considered the effect of section 309 in the absence of a
cost recovery claim. Additionally, while courts have generally upheld
CERCLA's retroactive liability scheme,9 at least one commentator has
suggested the constitutional due process analysis might be different

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1).
Id. § 9658(b)(3).
Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A).
28 F.3d at 1091.
See Knox v. AC&S, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. Ind. 1988). This limitation could

be particularly significant in state court cases. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA cases. Pointing to the combination of Knox and
CERCLA's exclusive federal court jurisdiction, a state court might well hold that section
309 has no application in state court cases.
91. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,734
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
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where an act of Congress retroactively changes a state level statute of
limitations."

D.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'

1.
Statutory Framework. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 9 along with the extensive regulations promulgated under that statute, comprise what is arguably the most complex
of all environmental laws. Although even a cursory survey of the entire
RCRA program is far beyond the scope of this Article,9 5 a brief description of RCRA subtitle C will be helpful in understanding the cases
discussed below.
RCRAs subtitle C was intended to create a "cradle to grave" scheme
for controlling the generation, transportation and ultimate disposal of
g Although it captures a vast range of materials,
"hazardous waste.*m
the statute and regulations define the term hazardous waste very
narrowly. More specifically, before a material can be hazardous waste,
it must first meet the definition of solid waste.97 From the class of
materials deemed solid waste, RCRA defines two subgroups of solid
waste as hazardous waste." The first group of materials are commonly
referred to as characteristic hazardous waste because they exhibit one
of the four characteristics of hazardous waste: toxicity, ignitability,
corrosivity, or reactivity." The second group of materials are those the
EPA specifically lists in Sub-part D of the hazardous waste regulations."o
Among its many mandates, the RCRA regulatory scheme prohibits the
treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste at an unpermitted
facility."' Acquiring a treatment, storage or disposal ("TSD") facility
permit is so complex that it can take many years for the EPA to approve

92. See Alfred R. Light, New Federalism, Old Due Process, and Retroactive Revival:
ConstitutionalProblems with CERCLA's Amendment of State Law, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 365

(1992).
93.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1995).

94. Id.
95. For a more comprehensive treatment, see, Susan M. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous

Waste (BNA) (1994).
96. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
97. 40 C.F.R. 261.3(a) (1995); United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).

98. 40 C.F.R. 261.3(aX2).
99. Id. §§ 261.20-261.24.
100. Id. § 261.30.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1995).
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a permit application. 2 Because the range of hazardous waste activities that the regulations allow generators is extremely narrow, becoming
an inadvertent TSD Facility is one of the most dangerous (and common)
pitfalls in this area of environmental regulation.
2. Definition of Solid and Hazardous Waste. Inadvertent TSD
Facility status was precisely the dilemma facing a secondary lead
smelter in United States v. ILCO, Inc.'03 Although the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held ILCO liable on
a number of other theories, the district court rejected EPA's assertion
that ILCO was also operating an unpermitted TSD Facility due to its
storage of lead battery components for longer than the ninety-day
window allowed most generators of hazardous waste." 4 In this regard,
the district court agreed with ILCO that the lead components were not
hazardous waste; rather, they were raw materials not subject to RCRA
regulation. 5 The EPA appealed this portion of the district court's
opinion to the Eleventh Circuit which reversed, holding that the lead
components were hazardous waste
and ILCO therefore had operated a
06
TSD facility without a permit.
It was beyond question that the lead components exhibited the
characteristic of toxicity so that, if the material met the definition of a
solid waste, it would clearly be a hazardous waste and ILCO would be
an unpermitted TSD Facility.' 7 Thus, the key to the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis was whether the lead components were "solid
waste."'0o
Building on the definition found in the statute,' the RCRA regulations define a solid waste as any "discarded material" that is not
otherwise excluded by the regulations"0 . "Discarded material" means
any material that is "abandoned," "recycled," or considered "inherently
wastelike.""' Looking at ILCO's process, the Eleventh Circuit evaluat-

102. In fact, Congress found it necessary to establish a program called "interim status"
for facilities waiting approval of an application. See 42

U.S.C.

6925(e).

103. 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1993).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

United States v. Ilco, Inc., 1990 WL 300298 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
Id. at *7.
996 F.2d at 1132.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1130.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1995).
40 C.F.R. 261.2(aX1) (1995).
Id. § 261.2 (a)(2).
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ed whether the lead components qualified as a solid waste by virtue of
being a recycled material." 2
Under the regulation, not all materials, however, constitute solid
waste when recycled. Rather, recycled material is only solid waste if it
fits within one of seven categories."' Further, the seven categories of
materials only become solid waste when recycled in specific manners." 4 The Eleventh Circuit focused on the first category of materials, "Spent Materials," which are solid waste when recycled by reclamation." 5 The term "spent material" is defined as "any material that has
been used and as a result of contamination can no longer serve the
purpose for which it was produced without processing."" Tying those
provisions together, the court held: "'Reclaimed material' clearly
includes lead values derived from the [lead components] at issue here
.... Thus, the applicable regulations are unambiguous with respect to
spent lead components used in a recycling process: spent materials 'are
solid waste when reclaimed'"." 7
The Eleventh Circuit further bolstered its holding by emphasizing that
the EPA has specifically stated that recycled lead components from
batteries "are solid wastes under the federal regulations because they
are spent materials being reclaimed.""' The court noted the general
rule that "'courts accord great deference to the interpretation of statutes
and regulations by the agency charged with administering that
regulatory scheme.'"" 9 Accordingly, the court explained that the
EPA's view that recycled lead components from batteries are solid
wastes was entitled to substantial deference. 2 0 The court went on to
state, "[wie have found nothing in the language of the statute, and ILCO
that EPA's
has brought forth nothing from the legislative history to show
2'
sanctioned."'
have
would
Congress
one
not
is
policy choice
3. Citizens' Suits. Like several of the major environmental
statutes, RCRA contains a "citizens' suit" provision 22 which allows
private persons to bring actions for non-compliance with certain

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

996 F.2d at 1131.
40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (Table 1).
Id.
996 F.2d at 1131 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (Table 1)).
40 C.F.R. 261.1(cX1).
996 F.2d at 1131.
57 Fed. Reg. 960-61 (1992).
996 F.2d at 1132 n.11.
Id. (quoting Borden v. Meese, 803 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 1132.
42 U.S.C. § 7604. See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.

1374

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

provisions of the statute where the government has failed to enforce the
requirements in question.1' In PaperRecycling, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
refused to grant summary judgment against a property owner who filed
a citizen's suit against a petroleum pipeline company where petroleum
products had escaped from the pipeline onto the plaintiff's property."24
The Plaintiff based its claim on the "imminent hazard" section of
RCRAs citizen's suit provision which allows a private party to commence
a civil action on its own behalf:
against any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or
present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present
owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 12
In allowing Plaintiff's citizen's suit to stand, the court agreed with a
handful of other district courts which have held that the "leaking" of
petroleum products into soil or groundwater constitutes "disposal" and
that, once the petroleum product escapes from the underground vessel,
the material is solid waste by virtue of being "abandoned."12 6 Thus, the
court held that Plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to show that the
defendant's "disposal" of solid waste represented "an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 27
Although the cases cited by the district court do support its holding,
there is authority to the contrary from other federal jurisdictions, at
least in the context of petroleum underground storage tanks ("UST's").
In Winston v. Shell Oil Co.,'s the court held that releases of petroleum
products from USTs is regulated solely under Subchapter IX of the
SWDA and that subchapter IX has no citizen's suit provision."2
Therefore, the court reasoned, the government has the exclusive

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

856 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
Id. at 674.
42 U.S.C § 6972(aX1XB) (1995).
See Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
856 F. Supp. at 675.
861 F. Supp. 713 (C.D. Ill.
1994).
Id. at 718.
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authority to enforce violations caused by releases from petroleum
USTs.130

130. 864 F. Supp. at 718. See also Edison Elec. Inst, v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (upholding EPA's interpretation that petroleum USTs are not subject to regulation
under the hazardous waste program).

